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IS CULTURAL IMPOSIDON LESS OF AN ISSUE WTIH
INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGIES?
Ype H. Poortinga

University of Tilburg, Netherlands &
Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium

An important reason for the development of indigenous psychologies
is the alleged imposition of western cultural ideas and beliefs embedded
in mainstream psychology. This contemporary psychology found in the
affluent western countries can be considered as an indigenous psychology
of which the relevance for other parts of the world should be questioned.
However, the unconditional endorsement of the need for a plurality of
indigenous psychologies carries crucial implications. Such a plurality assumes, as a rule, that knowledge in psychology does not hold for the
human species as a whole. Moreover, almost per definition cultural outsiders are (more) wrong and cultural insiders (more) right on issues concerning their own culture. The thesis of this chapter is that variations in knowledge and insights associated with various indigenous perspectives can
enrich psychology as a universal science of human behavior, but that
insiders do not have a natural advantage when it comes to theoretical
insights.

Indigenous Psychologies and the RelativismUniversalism Contrast

To clarify the topic of discussion a distinction can be made between
indigenization at three levels, namely (a) theory and conceptualization,
Cb) operationalization, and (c) the topics and issues addressed by the
profession of psychologists, both in research and in practice.
To begin with the last point, archives such as PsycLit show that
contemporary psychology is mainly engaged with concerns prevalent in
western societies. Issues of illiteracy and poverty and how these can be
addressed in intervention programs draw far less attention than, for example, individual psychotherapy or the psychological concomitants of
heart surgery. Berry, Poortinga, Segall, and Dasen (2002; see also Poortinga,
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1999) speak about the ethnocentrism of psychology, including cross-cultural psychology, and they see the selection of topics, dominated by the
affluent part of the world, as the most serious expression of such ethnocentrism. Obviously, research and application directed at local problems and
needs requires local contextual knowledge . Does this mean that psychological findings acquired elsewhere are largely irrelevant, or only that they
need to be screened for local relevance? Even a tentative answer to this
problem depends on one's theoretical position concerning the relationship
between behavior and culture.
The second level of ethnocentrism has to do with operationalization,
i.e., the way domains of behavior and concepts are crystallized in assessment instruments and separate items within such instruments. Psychological processes and traits, however defined, can rarely be assessed without
reference to actual behavior repertoire. In so far as this repertoire of behavior differs across cultures, common assessment instruments show
inequivalent or incomparable results (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). The
history of comparison of cognitive test scores as a basis for racial distinctions issues a loud and clear warning. However, the fact that data can be
inequivalent does not yet mean that all data are inequivalent. Moreover,
as we shall see later, different levels of equivalence can be distinguished.
The answer to the question whether or not equivalence is a realistic goal,
again depends on one's views of the relationship between behavior and
culture.
The third level at which cultural imposition can take place is the level
of theory and conceptualization. Typically, western theories and concepts
are studied in cross-cultural psychology. These concepts have emerged in
the socio-historical context of western societies and have been formalized
in religious and philosophical thinking. Do these concepts apply elsewhere, and vice versa, do concepts from other contexts have relevance in
western settings? In other words, are local theories likely to be more valid
or is it more meaningful to work towards universal theories of behavior?
Answers to the questions raised so far depend to a large extent on
one's (meta-) theoretical perspective. In contemporary cross-cultural psychology the major distinction is between cultural relativism and psychological universalism (Berry et al., 2002). The latter acknowledges deep
influences of cultural context on behavior, but also recognizes that psychological functions and processes are shared by humans in all cultural
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groups. This choice for primacy of the organism not only as a biological
but also as a bio-psychological or bio-social entity implies that a search for
what is psychologically universal can be productive despite all the cultural
diversity in manifest behavior. In cultural relativism the primacy of the
biological organism is not denied for basic processes like, for example,
reflexes, but the emphasis is on typically human behavior for which a
primacy of culture is postulated. Cultural practices are not explained in
terms of common psychological principles, but rather seen as expressions
of a unique culture and its historical roots. The literature on indigenous
psychology tends to take the latter rather than the former perspective,
either as an intermediate (Sinha, 1997; Enriquez, 1993) or as a definite
(Kim & Berry, 1993; Shweder, 1990) position.
In my view there are various theoretical difficulties with such a perspective that will be presented in the following in the form of three paradoxes.
1.

2.
3.

Ethologists compare across species, and culturalists emphasize noncomparability within the human species.
Postulates of incomparability pre-empt empirical tests of incomparability.
Smaller cross-cultural differences are found for more general traits.

Paradox 1. Ethologists Compare across Species, and Culturalists
Emphasize Non-Comparability within the Human Species

There are now numerous studies of chimpanzees and other great
apes that suggest cultural variations in behavior patterns. For chimpanzees
Whiten et al. (1999) could list 65 behaviors that appeared to be socially
transmitted. Thirty-nine of these were customary or habitual at some observation sites while they had not been observed at other sites. These
patterns were mainly concerned with sexual advances, grooming and the
use of tools, and variations resembled those between human societies.
Russon (2002) studied how orang-utans raised in captivity and later gradually released in their traditional habitat acquired patterns of tool use and
preparation of certain foods for consumption from other orang-utans that
they met. Russon freely uses terms such as "culture and cognition," "apprenticeship," "enculturation" and a "life history perspective" for great
apes. Rendell and Whitehead (2001) suggest that there is even fairly exten-
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sive evidence from field studies to the effect that cultural transmission can
be found in whales and dolphins, using definitions of culture centering on
social learning.
While the general argument in ethology tends towards continuity and
similarity across species and through phylogenetic history, cross-cultural
psychologists with a relativist orientation lean towards essential differentiation. When Shweder et al. (1998) make a distinction between mind and
mentality, they go on to emphasize the latter, culture-specific, orientation
on human behavior. Similarly, Valsiner (2000, p. 85) argues that "both
persons and contexts are culturally constituted ... the life of humans as
species differs dramatically from other biological species even when rudiments of cultural organization of life can be found, as among higher
primates."
Thus, ethologists focus on the analysis of psychological functions;
variations in behavior are seen to provide evidence of culture as a faculty
or aptitude of a species, rather than evidence of psychological differences
(in mentality or psyche) between various groups. Cultural psychologists
tend to see variations in behavior as evidence of differences in psychological functioning; the essence of human behavior derives from (culturespecific) meaning and/or intention.
It can be argued that genetic similarity across species and within
the human species is pointing to culture as a biological faculty that defines
constraints as well as affordances (or opportunities) for behavior variation
within the human species (Poortinga & Soudijn, 2002). For two reasons
this does not help much in the discussion about this paradox. First, the
pathways from genetic information to manifest behavior remain largely
uncharted, allowing authors freedom of interpretation about the extent to
which there are constraints that would argue against relativism and to
which extent variations in behavior-culture interactions point to affordances
that would argue against a universalistic viewpoint. The second reason is
that the boundaries between what is seen as shared/similar and what is
seen as specific can change over time without much effect on basic positions. Thus, it is rather obvious that the strong version of relativism reflected by Shweder in 1990 has shifted considerably in later years (cf. Shweder
et al., 1998). A similar shift can be observed when comparing a recent
review of Miller (2002) with work of only a few years earlier (cf. Miller,
1997). Even though it can be argued that strong relativism has become
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somewhat marginalized under the influence of biological thinking in psychology authors like those mentioned continue to distance themselves
from a universalist perspective. Hence, this paradox has not come much
closer to resolution.
Paradox 2: Postulates of Incomparability Pre-Empt Empirical
Tests of Incomparability

The two (meta-) theoretical perspectives of relativism and universalism have consequences for the cross-cultural analysis of the empirical
validity of psychological concepts. There are numerous concepts that according to the authors who published about them cannot be readily translated into English. Examples of such (non-western) indigenous concepts
are the emotions of song (Lutz, 1988) and liget(Rosaldo, 1980) and personality constructs like anasakti (Pande & Naidu , 1992), machismo (DiazGuerrero, 1993), and philotimo (Triandis & Vassiliou, 1972).
Let me take the latter as an example. According to Triandis and
Vassiliou (1972, pp. 308-309) someone who is phi/otimous "behaves towards members of his in-group the way they expect him to behave." They
write: "A person who has this characteristic is polite, virtuous, reliable,
proud, has a 'good soul,' behaves correctly, meets his obligations, does his
duty, is truthful, generous, self-sacrificing, tactful, respectful, and grateful."
When a large proportion of the Greeks report that they see themselves as
phi/otimous there are two basic orientations in the interpretation of this
finding. First, there is something to phi/otimo that the Greeks have and
"we" do not have. Second, philotimo (philotimous behavior) can be observed with us, it is just not explicit in our language or self-reports; for
example, it is a particular blend of common human dispositions that has
become salient in the Greek language and society probably for sociocultural-historical reasons.
Can we do empirical research that brings us closer to a solution? It
follows from the first paradox that theoretical arguments pro and con these
two positions are not going to provide a definite answer. If we turn to
empirical research, this would have to be comparative in one way or
another, either using the same instniment or different instruments, but
With some means of linking data obtained from non-Greek samples with
those of Greek samples. Comparison requires some common standard
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(Beny et al., 2002; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997) both at the conceptual
level and at the level of measurement. There are three different opinions
on the feasibility of such a standard; it tends to be either (i) denied, (ii)
presented as a research question, or (iii) taken for granted.
Although comparability, or equivalence, of concepts and instruments
transferred from one culture to another tends to be denied by relativistic
researchers, it is not uncommon to find that they are actually making
comparisons. At the very minimum these amount to the claim that something in another target culture is essentially different from the state of
affairs found in one's own culture ( what is the basis of such claims if all
valid comparison is ruled out?). In addition, one finds explanations in the
way local concepts are culture-specific (how can such explanations be
given if comparison is ruled out?). For example, in the very same book
where Shweder 0990) hackled the tradition of culture-comparative psychology, he coauthored a study conducted in India and the USA, interpreting "the similarities and differences in the moral understandings of children and adults in the two cultures" (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990,
p. 131).
Virtually all researchers in cross-cultural psychology accept that crosscultural differences in scores on tests and questionnaires cannot be interpreted at face value, because of the likelihood of cultural impositions and
bias being introduced with the transfer of methods and instruments across
cultures. However, in sources such as the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology and the International Journal ofPsychology one can find numerous comparisons where the scores on some instrument administered in
different cultural samples are being compared without clear evidence to
the effect that the scores indeed can serve as a valid common standard for
such comparisons. In other words, equivalence is assumed but not demonstrated. In my view many of the criticisms of culturalist researchers on
culture-comparative research are justified because of the discrepancies
between what is preached and what is practiced.
The remaining possibility is that equivalence of concepts and methods is neither taken for granted nor rejected summarily. If I am not
mistaken, this option has been gaining ground in recent years. The need
for establishing equivalence as a condition for valid comparison has become more widely recognized, as testified by literature on this topic, like
the well-known text by Van de Vijver & Leung 0997). If one compares the
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various levels of equivalence and the array of approaches distinguished by
these authors with the rather simplistic notions in the 1960s and 1970s
about absence and presence of (item) bias as a kind of dichotomy, considerable progress has been made. Unfortunately, there is a price to pay for
more sophisticated research; design and analysis are becoming more complex, and the size of data sets has to be increased.
The empirical search for common standards does not only pertain to
measurement, but also to the comparability of concepts. An issue on
which fairly extensive research has been conducted in recent years, is that
of the cross-cultural validity of personality trait dimensions, such as the
dimensions ("Big Five") postulated by the Five Factor Model. The most
commonly used instrument is the NEO-Pl-R (Costa & Mccrae, 1992). Similarities in factor structures across a range of countries have been the basis
of claims for universality (e.g., McCrae, 2000; McCrae & Allik, 2002). However, when local personality inventories were administered with the NEOPI-R to Chinese respondents an additional factor emerged, labeled Interpersonal Relatedness. Such a finding can be seen as evidence of culturespecificity in personality make-up. One can also go a step fu1ther and raise
the question what happens if instruments constructed in China are administered in the USA and elsewhere (cf. Cheung & Leung, 1998). The interpersonal relatedness factor has been replicated in a multiethnic sample in
Hawaii, tentatively suggesting that this aspect of personality is not only
present in Chinese cultures (Cheung et al., 2001). Similarly, Stewart et al.
(2002) found that the Chinese notion of guan, which refers to the social,
ization and training of children, in part appeared to function in a similar ,
way in the USA and Pakistan as in Hong Kong.
All in all, I am more optimistic about the scope for resolution of this
second paradox than of the first one. Undoubtedly, the evidence will not
always be straightfo1ward and easy to interpret, but in so far as researchers
can reach consensus that methods are tentative standards that should be
examined for equivalence, there is a way fo1ward. To which extent philotimo
is better seen as a culture-specific ingredient of personality make-up among
the Greeks and to which extent it is as a language-specific reference to a
more widely shared trait or cluster of traits is one of the questions that can
then be pursued further.
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Paradox 3: Smaller Cross-Cultural Differences Are Found
for More General Traits

For cultures geographically not too close together one can easily find
psychological variables (e.g., specific skills, attitudes, beliefs) for which
there is hardly any overlap in distribution, while individuals within each
culture behave in a similar way; the within-culture variance is small compared to the between-<:ulture variance. With measures that pertain to broader
aspects of behavior, such as cognitive abilities, moral principles and personality traits, we find quite the reverse; between-culture variance is much
smaller than within-culture variance (e.g., Poortinga & Van Hemert, 2001).
Thus, if we examine broader and more inclusive concepts cross-cultural
differences become less prominent. Among others Cole (e.g., Scribner &
Cole, 1981; Cole, 1996) has argued forcefully for the context-specificity of
relationships between culture and behavior.
This third paradox implies that in a psychological sense differences
between cultures apparently are not coherent across broader domains of
behavior and psychological functioning. This makes it doubtful whether
culture does have system qualities at the psychological level. At the same
time, it is difficult to find conclusive evidence. If two cultures differ simultaneously in respect of two variables these differences may hang together
somehow, but causal relationships and coincidence often have a similar
appearance; it is difficult to differentiate between coincidental and systematic relationships. Perhaps the most convincing arguments are to be found
in the history of cross-cultural research. Even a superficial analysis shows
that in new areas of research initially broad and inclusive characterizations
tend to be postulated, leading to sweeping conclusions about more general differences between cultural groups. Subsequently, such differences
are redressed to much smaller proportions. For example, in perception
research earlier notions about greater sensory acuity of traditional peoples,
or general differences in perceptual modalities (with African groups tending towards the auditory and Western groups tending towards the visual
modality), have long been abandoned. What have remained are quite
specific differences, for example in susceptibility for certain visual illusions, and the skill to perceive depth in certain pictures (e.g., Deregowski,
1980). In cognition different modes of thinking were postulated, notably
on the basis of literacy and schooling. None of these "great divide theo-
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ries" (Segall, Dasen, Beny, & Poortinga, 1999) has been upheld. In personality research there has been a shift from the characterization of entire
populations in a single "modal" trait to the above mentioned search of
universal trait dimensions. Similar examples can be found in other domains of behavior (Poortinga, in press).
A resolution of this third paradox is possible if one conceives of a
culture as a behavior repertoire consisting of a large set of conventions or
practices (cf. Poortinga, Van de Vijver, Joe, & Van de Koppel, 1987). Such
conventions and cultural rules are directly observable, or require only
small inferential steps, as they tend to be limited to quite situation specific
concepts. According to Girndt (2000) conventions are not limited to overt
actions, they include beliefs, ways to handle problems (e.g., believing that
stone houses are better than wooden houses), and explanations of rules
and concepts (e.g., looking at someone while talking shows honesty and
openness, versus not looking someone in the eye is a matter of respect).
From such a perspective it is also conceivable that there can be local
cultural variations in the conceptualization of psychological functions and
processes.
Conclusion

Historically indigenous psychology movements can be seen as an
appropriate reaction against the tendency among western researchers to
see their psychology as an accomplished science and field of application
to which "others" can only add details. Such a perspective in my view
amounts to a serious overestimation of the state of development of psychology, even if one assumes that systematic accumulation of knowledge
on human behavior is possible. However, if this critical view has merit, it
should equally apply to other indigenous psychologies.
The resolution of paradoxes as presented in this chapter points to the
need for an understanding of cross-cultural invariance as well as variations
in behavior. Such understanding can constrain the range of plausible and
valid answers to the lead question of this chapter, namely whether cultural
imposition is less of an issue with indigenous psychologies. These more
definite answers can be best pursued with a common research agenda of
all indigenous psychologies, including the one called "mainstream." Power
differences that continue to exist between the "North" and the "South" in
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terms of scope for research, financial resources and access to international
publication outlets (Adair, Coelho, & Luna, 2001) form the main impediment to such a common agenda.
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